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I. Introduction
Despite more than 30 years of efforts to harmonize international financial
regulatory and prudential policies, the topic of how to resolve a large, complex
international bank was missing from the agenda of the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision. The financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the realization that
many large, complex international financial institutions had become too-big-to-
fail moved the topic of resolution' from virtual obscurity to the top of the
2international regulatory agenda. The magnitude of the recent crisis has focused
t Jacob Safra Professor of International Banking, Professor of Finance and Co-
Director of the Wharton Financial Institutions Center, the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
1. "Resolution" is the process through which claims against an insolvent entity are
allocated across creditors. For most firms, countries rely on some sort of bankruptcy process to resolve
such claims, but a special administrative regime is often established to resolve claims against a financial
institution because such an institution may lose all of its going-concern value in a lengthy bankruptcy
procedure and may cause serious problems for other institutions that are linked to it in various interbank
markets. Going-concern value is the value in excess of liquidation value that a firm can earn if it
continues operations.
2. "Too-big-to-fail" is a catch-all for institutions that are too big to fail, too complex to
fail, too opaque to fail, too interconnected to fail or too correlated to fail. Although I will use it in this
general sense, it should be noted that it is misleading. Very large financial institutions, like Fidelity or
PIMCO, that control hundreds of billions of dollars in assets are unlikely to be of systemic importance
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attention on resolution policy for the simple reason that too-big-to-fail is too
costly to continue. Andrew Haldane estimated that guarantees and subsidies
extended by the U.S., the U.K. and the Euro area to support the financial
system amounted to 25% of world GDP in November 20095 (see Figure 1). Not
only are these costs large relative to global output, but also the costs to some
individual countries exceeded their capacity to provide credible support. For
example, Ireland's bailout of its banks transformed a banking crisis into a
sovereign debt crisis.6 Before the crisis, however, authorities appear to have
ignored the warning signs of weaknesses in resolution procedures.
The crisis of 2008-2009 highlighted the lack of effective resolution
planning. When the Group of Twenty convened during the crisis, one of its
initial actions was to transform the Financial Stability Forum into the Financial
Stability Board and charge it with the responsibility of improving and
harmonizing international resolution regimes in order to ensure cooperative
outcomes if an international financial institution should require resolution. One
of the Financial Stability Board's major accomplishments has been agreement
on Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes. 7 Moreover, the FSB put in
place a peer review process to monitor the progress each member country
makes in adopting the key attributes. And each November, it issues a list of
Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs). Eight of the twenty-nine G-
SIBs designated in November 2013 are headquartered in the United States.8
This article examines some of the fundamental challenges to achieving a
cooperative solution in the cross-border resolution of a G-SIB and a potential
way around some of these problems. The next section examines the challenges
of achieving a cooperative domestic resolution of a large, complex bank within
the United States. The third section shows that many of the challenges
identified in the previous section are amplified in an international setting. But
one challenge is qualitatively different: the world lacks any mechanism to
devise and enforce agreements to harmonize resolution policies and practices
because of their transparency and lack of leverage. In contrast, institutions that are much smaller may be
systemically important because of the critical role they play in the financial system. For example, Bank
of New York Mellon, which is by no means the largest bank in the U.S., plays a key role in the tri-party
RePo market, which is considered to be of systemic importance.
3. See Thomas Huertas, Sunshine Banking (unpublished manuscript) (May 16, 2011),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/research/documents/ccbs/ccbsworkshop20 11 /paper huertas.pdf
(suggesting that fundamentally the solution must be either to make banks fail-safe or safe to fail).
4. Andrew Haldane, Chief Economist, Bank of Eng., Banking on the State, Address at
at the 12th Annual Federal Reserve of Chicago International Banking Conference (Sept. 25, 2009).
5. Note that this was before a series of costly bailouts in the euro area, several rounds of
quantitative easing across the world and the cost of the bailout of the GSEs became apparent.
6. This is an interesting reversal of the pattern in the 1980s when a string of sovereign
defaults threatened the solvency of many of the largest banks in the world.
7. Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, FIN.
STABILITY BD. (Oct. 2011), www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r 111 104cc.pdf.
8. 2013 Update of Group of Global Systemically Important Banks (G-SIBs), FIN.
STABILITY BD. (Nov. 11, 2013), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_131 11 1.pdf.
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across national borders. Section 4 illustrates why these problems should not
have surprised regulators. It reviews some notable historical crises that
illustrate the key challenges that have been described in the preceding sections.
The fifth and concluding section examines a possible way around these
problems, proposed jointly by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and
the Bank of England. This proposal is called the Single Point of Entry (SPOE),
and it attempts to finesse the fundamental challenges to cooperation identified
in the preceding sections.
II. The Challenge of an Orderly Resolution in a National Context
Because of its regulatory complexity, the United States provides clear
examples of many of the problems that arise in the cross-border resolution of a
G-STB. All of the American G-SIBs have not only complex global structures
with many hundreds of affiliates located abroad, but also hundreds of domestic
affiliates. Before the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (DFA), a U.S. bank financial conglomerate was subject to multiple
resolution procedures within the U.S., with no established approach for
coordinating the actions of the multiple regulatory authorities involved. The
insured bank would be subject to the FDIC's prompt corrective action9
measures and, unless the systemic risk exception were invoked, the FDIC
would be constrained to select the resolution method that was least costly to the
deposit insurance fund.
A G-SIB headquartered in the U.S. is almost certain to be part of a
holding company, which would also need to be resolved.10 Since bank holding
companies sometimes own 20% to 40% of the assets of the group, a lack of
coordination between the bankruptcy court and the FDIC could easily lead to
chaos. In addition, if the G-SIB had a securities subsidiary, the broker-dealer
would be subject to Chapter 7 liquidation proceedings under the bankruptcy
law and the special resolution procedures of the Securities Investor Protection
Corporation, while the rest of the securities unit would be subject to resolution
by the court under Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings. Finally, if an affiliated
insurance company were insolvent, it would be unwound under the individual
state insurance guarantee systems. Thus, the resolution of a large, complex
bank in the United States would involve both bankruptcy procedures and
administrative procedures with no obvious way to coordinate the actions by the
various entities involved.
9. For a description of the prompt corrective action process and the systemic risk
exemption see FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., MANUAL OF EXAMINATION POLICIES, § 2.1
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/safety/manual/section2-I.pdf.
10. See the recent GAO study for some of the complexities involving bank holding
companies, U.S. Gov. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, BANKRUPTCY: COMPLEX FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
AND INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION POSE CHALLENGES (2011),
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/dll707.pdf.
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Apart from the Fed and the FDIC," none of the other regulators or
judicial authorities was required to consider the systemic risk implications of its
decisions. Their first and foremost obligation was to protect the customers of
the failing entity within their regulatory domain. Inevitably, they would ring-
fence the assets they regulated for the benefit of the customers they were
charged with protecting. Only after this objective had been met would they
consider releasing additional assets to the parent.
This fragmentation of regulatory oversight and resolution responsibilities
is exacerbated by the tendency to conceal unfavorable information as long as
possible. This is true within a firm when a risk-taker may try to defer reporting
bad news in the hope that losses can be recouped and need not be reported. In
fact, this kind of behavior is a key challenge for the corporate governance of
risk within the institution. The same is often true between the firm and its
primary regulator. The firm may hope that it can offset the loss and may fear
that it will lose its discretion to deal with the problem or even that key
managers may be fired once the primary regulator is involved.
Similar incentives may motivate the primary regulator. The primary
regulator may be reluctant to share bad news with other regulators in the hope
that it can take remedial action so that no public intervention is necessary. It
may fear that if another regulator is informed, the latter will take preemptive
action that will limit the primary regulator's flexibility in dealing with the
problem. In addition, the primary regulator is keenly aware of the ever-present
danger of a run by uninsured depositors or other short-term creditors if the
unfavorable information is leaked to the public. The market may force the
primary regulator to intervene aggressively when it would prefer to delay in the
hope that the institution's problems might be self-correcting. Several
unfortunate examples have surfaced in the U.S. in which, for example, the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has denied access to a troubled bank
by the FDIC. Even within one country unfavorable information does not flow
freely among institutions overseeing different parts of the same institution.
Many other challenges in resolving a large, complex global bank are
apparent within the United States. Corporate structures are very complex,
usually including affiliates that span two or (often many) more domestic
regulatory domains. Lines of business are usually managed in an integrated
fashion without much attention to the legal entities that may be involved. And,
in the event of financial distress, it is essential to coordinate the actions among
various regulatory authorities and courts that may have differing objectives,
obligations and powers. Although central bankers universally adopt the
doctrine of constructive ambiguity to deter moral hazard, market participants
tend to make inferences from what the authorities actually do rather than what
they say. Thus a policy of constructive ambiguity is doomed to fail unless
11. The least cost constraint notwithstanding.
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market participants believe that policy responses will be random. Since it seems
unlikely that the regulators will be throwing dice to determine when to provide
a bailout, market participants will make assumptions about what the authorities
are likely to do based on what they have done in the past. If policymakers take
actions that are inconsistent with these expectations, the spillover effects are
likely to be much larger because many market participants are likely to
withdraw from taking risky positions until they are sure that they understand
the new rules of the game. Many market participants expressed surprise that
Lehman Brothers was sent to bankruptcy court since Bear Steams, a much
smaller, less complicated bank had been bailed out. The immediate bailout of
AIG two days after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers served to heighten
uncertainty about the resolution regime and increased market pressures on
several other weak financial institutions around the world. Without a reliable,
predictable resolution regime, governments face an uncomfortable trade-off
between preserving stability in the short term through a bailout and enhancing
stability in the long run by providing incentives for the market to discipline
risky behavior. Creditors will lack incentives to monitor and discipline a risky
institution unless at least some losses are allocated to uninsured, unsecured
creditors. Political pressures (and the fact that the long run is irrelevant unless
the system can survive the short run) have led to unprecedented government
interventions not only in the U.S., but also in several other countries. The lack
of appropriate resolution tools has too often resulted in hastily arranged
bailouts negotiated over chaotic, sleepless weekends.
Nonetheless, it should be possible to design a coherent resolution regime
to deal with a purely domestic financial collapse because the domestic affiliates
of a U.S.-based G-SIB are subject to U.S. law and new laws that could be
enacted by Congress.12 The U.S. judicial system can resolve disputes and
enforce its decisions, and federal administrative authorities can assume
extraordinary powers. Conflicts in regulatory objectives and powers among
specialist regulators and between state and federal regulators can be resolved.
The U.S. has the capacity to devise and implement a coherent domestic
resolution regime, although, before the Dodd-Frank Act, it lacked the will to do
so.
III. Orderly Resolution in the International Context
Of course, the effective resolution of a G-SIB requires an effective
domestic resolution regime in the home country. But this is a necessary, not a
sufficient condition. Any G-SIB worth worrying about has hundreds of
affiliates abroad that are often tightly integrated with operations in the U.S. in
complex and opaque ways. All of the potential problems noted in the previous
12. Congress, despite its normal mode of operation, does still seem to be capable of
taking quick action in an emergency.
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section also present obstacles to an international resolution, but to a much
greater degree. The resolution authorities must face an even greater amount of
corporate, legal and regulatory complexity and it is essential to coordinate the
actions of an even broader range of authorities with even greater differences in
objectives, obligations and powers than can be found within the U.S. But the
crucial difference is that the global economy lacks any political or judicial
authority to resolve conflicts. This makes it much more likely that a domestic
insolvency proceeding may result in a much greater loss of going-concern
value and a much greater risk of financial disruptions that might flow across
national borders.
When countries believe that their national interests are in jeopardy, their
first instinct will be to ring-fence any assets of the failing institution that they
can grab. The possibility that one or more national authorities may ring-fence
the part of the business that they can control makes a cross-border resolution
qualitatively different than a domestic resolution.'3
With no mechanism to force authorities in different sovereign nations to
cooperate, enormous emphasis has been placed on various mechanisms to
facilitate voluntary cooperation. These vary from Memoranda of
Understanding, to the formation of Regulatory Colleges for specific G-SIBs, to,
more recently, the formation of Crisis Management Groups for each G-SIB.
Whether these mechanisms can be effective in the heat of a crisis remains an
open question. For these agreements to work, the authorities must be willing to
share information freely on a timely basis.
But all of the inhibitions regarding the sharing of unfavorable information
that were noted in the domestic context are magnified when they involve cross-
border transfers of information. In addition, the primary regulator may fear that
some of its foreign counterparts will have a legal obligation to take an action
that will force it to make an aggressive intervention that it would prefer to
delay. Of course, the concern about setting off a run is even greater because the
more broadly information is shared, the more likely it is to be leaked, if only by
accident. Moreover, the foreign regulator may be subject to a stricter disclosure
regime than the primary regulator. Consequently, the right people are unlikely
to have the right information at the right time to take appropriate action.
Cross-border cooperation is also made difficult by some fundamental
differences across countries. For example, countries may differ philosophically
over how to deal with a weak bank. At one extreme, a country may believe that
banks should be subjected to market discipline and bankruptcy procedures like
any other kind of firm. Such countries emphasize transparency, attestations
regarding solvency from senior executives and board members and personal
liability for directors as the main bulwark against financial instability. New
13. While specialist regulators may attempt to ring-fence in the United States, federal
authorities can, in principle, compel cooperation among specialist regulators.
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Zealand, for example, prefers to rely on market discipline to control excessive
risk-taking by banks and, if necessary, to resolve banks through the courts. At
the other end of the spectrum, several countries have a tradition of heavy
reliance on official intervention and support to sustain a weak bank. Market
discipline tends to be weaker in these countries, because creditors worry less
about sustaining a loss. This kind of approach may be found in the actions (if
not the rhetoric) of some Continental European countries. These differences in
views about the appropriate way to deal with a weak bank can impede
cooperation in a crisis.
Countries also differ with regard to the goals of the resolution process
even more than within the United States where the main tension is between
specialist regulators, who seek to protect the clients of the part of the firm they
regulate, and the Federal Reserve and FDIC, which take a systemic view.
Should the resolution process attempt to protect the domestic banking industry
from foreign competitors? Should it seek to protect the domestic deposit
insurance fund? Is it obliged to protect domestic creditors? Does it have a
responsibility to preserve domestic financial stability? Should it minimize the
fiscal costs to domestic taxpayers? Must it take into account the maintenance of
local employment? Is the resolution authority responsible for minimizing the
spillover costs in all countries in which the G-SIB conducts business? Only the
last of these objectives is implausible. All of the others may be found, at least
implicitly, in the behavior of national resolution authorities and the laws
defining their responsibilities.
More fundamentally, will the resolution authority be charged with the
preservation of going-concern value? And, if it has the power to impose a stay
on creditors, how will the application of that stay be reconciled with the
objective of maximizing the value of the estate for creditors? The problem is
exacerbated by the fact that some firms may require aggressive, dynamic
trading to preserve asset values, and they will require liquidity support as well
as the ability to retain some key employees while the final disposition of the
firm is determined. Not all bankruptcy regimes, however, aim to preserve
going-concern value. These differences in the objectives of the resolution
process obviously complicate achievement of a coordinated, cross-border
resolution.
Countries also differ with regard to what should trigger a resolution. Most
countries recognize that if a bank cannot make payments when due, it should be
resolved. Although this is, strictly speaking, a liquidity standard, most
insolvencies are exposed by the reluctance of creditors to roll-over their claims
or to provide new funds to an institution. Of course, covert central bank lending
may disguise this problem for a considerable period of time.
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Other countries rely on book value net worth, recognizing that an
institution must be resolved when its net worth becomes negative. 14 How well
this works depends on the accounting standards that are employed, how
rigorously they are enforced and to what extent the resolution authority's
decision can be challenged. The book value of assets often lags the economic
value of assets, particularly when market values decline. This is especially true
when external auditors and the regulatory authorities are lax in requiring
provisions and loan loss reserves. Moreover, if the resolution authority is
subject to second-guessing by some other entity, it will generally wait until
book value net worth is negative beyond any reasonable doubt. This has the
perverse consequence that when resolution is finally triggered, it will be
necessary to allocate much larger losses. Some countries rely on the book value
of equity relative to total (or risk-weighted) assets. When the ratio falls below a
specified level, the authorities must intervene to resolve the institution. This
measure suffers from many of the same defects as the book value net worth
standard, except that if the ratios are set sufficiently high, intervention is more
likely to take place before the institution has racked up massive losses.
Moreover, use of a higher ratio to trigger resolution helps compensate for the
fact that the value of assets is likely to be overstated in times of stress. Because
of uncertainty over the true economic value of assets, it is much more realistic
to think about an insolvency range rather than a point of insolvency. Ideally
intervention should occur before the debt overhang problem begins to distort
decision-making by the bank.
Other countries appear to give the resolution authority much greater
discretion over when to intervene. The trigger may simply be that the
authorities perceive a threat to the interests of depositors. Clearly these
different triggers for intervention may lead to interventions at different times.' 5
Some countries may be required to intervene considerably sooner than others.
This presents yet another coordination challenge.
If a court procedure is to be employed rather than an administrative
process, the differences in view about which country should be the insolvency
jurisdiction become important. Should it be the jurisdiction in which the bank is
chartered? The seat of management? The principal place of business? The
location of the largest concentration of assets? Or the location of the largest
concentration of creditors? A case could be made for any of these criteria.
Unfortunately, some institutions are organized in such a way that each of these
criteria may lead to a different answer. The choice of insolvency jurisdiction
will have critical importance because it will determine which entity can initiate
the resolution process. The chartering/supervisory authority? Creditors? The
14. Because national accounting standards have not yet converged, even if the
authorities agreed on some sort of book value measure of insolvency, differences would remain.
15. The examples of Herstatt and Lehman Brothers described below demonstrate some
of the difficulties that occur when countries intervene at different times in an uncoordinated manner.
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bank itself? It may also provide different answers to the critical question of
how the integrated business is mapped into the legal entities and regulatory
domains that must be taken through a resolution process. Which authority can
allocate assets to legal entities? Which authority allocates legal entities to
resolution authorities or bankruptcy courts?
The choice of the insolvency jurisdiction also implies differences in legal
procedures such as the right of set-off and permissible carve-outs. 16 Under what
conditions will counterparties be permitted to close-out, net and liquidate
collateral before bankruptcy proceedings? If collateral is liquid, this permits
counterparties to settle other transactions that may have been linked to
positions with the failed bank, but if the collateral is illiquid, close-out netting
may exacerbate downward pressure on asset prices that will transmit losses to
other institutions. Although International Swaps and Derivatives Association
(ISDA) has achieved considerable success in harmonizing national laws
regarding these transactions to shield them from being tied up in bankruptcy
proceedings, some differences remain. Moreover, this has enabled a substantial
number of counterparties to have a super-priority that permits them to leapfrog
over other creditors in the bankruptcy queue. It also diminishes the incentives
for these counterparties, who are some of the best-informed market
participants, to monitor and discipline risk-taking.
The choice of insolvency jurisdiction may determine whether stays will be
imposed and if so, for how long. This is closely related to close-out netting
which will take place if positions are categorized as "qualified financial
contracts," which will be exempt from any stays that may be imposed in the
bankruptcy process.
The choice of insolvency jurisdiction may also have implications for the
treatment of foreign creditors. Do national customers of all classes have priority
over those abroad? Among classes of creditors, do all domestic depositors have
priority over foreign depositors? Will branches or agencies be treated as
separate legal entities? Will the authority with oversight of the separate legal
entity seek to marshal assets worldwide for the benefit of local creditors? Can
resolution proceedings be trumped by criminal charges?
Different insolvency jurisdictions may also be associated with differences
in powers and obligations of the resolution entity. Is the resolution entity
constrained to implement a resolution that is least costly to domestic
depositors? Must the resolution authority give priority to domestic depositors?
Does the resolution authority have the power to impose haircuts on creditors?
Can the resolution authority provide liquidity until the ultimate disposition of
861
16. For further discussion of insolvency coordination in an international context with a
discussion of netting, carve-outs and set-offs see Contact Grp. on the Legal and Inst'l Underpinnings of
the Int'l Fin. Sys., Insolvency Arrangements and Contract Enforceability, BANK OF INT'L SETTLEMENTS
30-35 (2002), http://www.bis.org/publ/gten06.pdf, especially pages .
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the failed group is determined? Does the resolution authority have the ability
(and resources) to provide a capital injection?
Although international treaties must maintain the polite fiction that all
nations are equal, this is clearly not true. Countries differ with regard to their
regulatory and supervisory resources - both in terms of human capital (the
number and quality of employees) and financial resources. They also differ
with regard to the quality of their financial infrastructures. A country that has
high-quality external audits, well-informed institutional creditors and investors,
a financial press that adopts a watchdog role and the ability to enforce
regulatory decisions can be a much more effective regulatory partner than a
country that lacks a strong financial infrastructure.
Asymmetries regarding exposure to the troubled G-SIB may also
influence incentives to take action. If the foreign subsidiary is economically
significant to the parent firm, the parent is much more likely to support it and
the home country authorities are more likely to provide support to the parent, if
necessary. On the other hand, if the foreign subsidiary is of minor importance
to the parent, but is systemically important in the host country, the host country
is more likely to take action. Problems may arise, however, when supervisory
responsibilities, fiscal responsibilities and accountability to the electorate are
misaligned. The home country authorities may lack incentives and the host
country may lack the power and resources to resolve the faltering entity.
Finally, unless resolution policy is implemented with great precision,
before a G-SIB exhausts its net worth, losses must be allocated. The allocation
of losses presents an additional challenge to achieving a cooperative resolution
because nations find it very difficult to agree on how to allocate losses.
Agreement is difficult ex ante because countries are understandably reluctant to
make an open-ended fiscal commitment. Moreover, they fear that by agreeing
to share in losses they may exacerbate moral hazard with regard to their foreign
counterparts. The authorities that have primary supervisory and regulatory
power may be less diligent in controlling the risk-taking of the G-SIB they
oversee if they can be sure that the costs of failure will be shared with
foreigners. As difficult as it is to agree on loss-sharing ex ante, however, it is
even more difficult ex post. Ex post, countries are likely to disagree over the
cause of the losses and the standards for allocating losses, and may have a
statutory obligation to favor national interests.
To sum up, the inability to impose an effective resolution regime at a
global level places enormous pressure on national resolution authorities to
cooperate. But this cooperation is inherently difficult to achieve because of
inhibitions on sharing information in a timely manner, differences in objectives,
rules resolution policies, and bankruptcy procedures, and asymmetries in the
capabilities, powers and incentives among national resolution authorities. All of
these tensions could be reduced, if not eliminated, by early intervention that
eliminates the necessity of allocating losses. But that outcome would require a
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remarkable degree of harmonization of resolution objectives, powers' 7 and
procedures that we have not yet achieved.
IV. Why Problems in Cross-Border Resolution Should Not Have Been a
Surprise
The neglect of these cross-border resolution challenges before the Great
Recession is surprising because most of the problems that plagued the
authorities in the Great Recession could have been anticipated from earlier
banking crises.' 8 These lessons include the reluctance of the national authorities
to share unfavorable information about a bank, the danger of uncoordinated and
conflicting actions by the authorities, the sensitivity of markets to unanticipated
behavior by the authorities, the challenge of resolving an institution with
substantial international corporate complexity, the disruptive impact of
applying bankruptcy procedures to institutions that had been actively engaged
in trading, the profound differences in resolution procedures and bankruptcy
laws, and the ambiguous benefits of close-out netting for qualified financial
contracts (QFCs).
Unfortunately, we have scant evidence that much was learned from these
earlier experiences. No major advances were made in national resolution
policies or in the coordination of resolution policies across countries. Indeed, as
financial activity became more concentrated in fewer, increasingly leveraged,
larger and more complex institutions,' 9 the financial system became more
vulnerable to the problems exposed in earlier crises. Only in the aftermath of
the recent crisis have major financial centers begun to reform their resolution
procedures.
This review of problems in cross-border resolution will begin in the 1970s
to emphasize that these challenges are not new. We will proceed
chronologically, starting with Herstatt and concluding with some of the notable
cross-border resolutions in the recent crisis.
A. Bankhaus Herstatt
The 1974 failure of Bankhaus Herstatt demonstrated the reluctance of
authorities to share unfavorable information about banks. The Bundesbank and
the German Federal Banking Authority closed Herstatt at the end of the
business day in Germany, which was the middle of the clearing day in New
17. Which would require that some countries modify laws that prohibit them from
intervening in a solvent institution.
18. Richard Herring, International Financial Conglomerates: Implications for National
Insolvency Regimes, in MARKET DISCIPLINE AND BANKING: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 99-129 (George
Kaufman ed., 2003).
19. Greater leverage amplified the impact of losses, complexity made institutions more
difficult to supervise and increased size extends the potential impact of the failure of the institution on
the real economy.
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York, where the dollar leg of Herstatt's foreign exchange transactions was
being settled. This action was apparently taken without informing other
regulators outside Germany. The timing of the closure was a surprise because
generally regulators had tried to close institutions over a weekend so that
normal clearing and settlement processes would not be disrupted. The
unanticipated behavior of the German authorities caused disproportionately
large spillovers. Interbank markets were disrupted because banks became wary
that they might be trapped in a Herstatt-like loss. Spreads in the Eurodollar
market widened to unprecedented levels and left some banks rationed out of the
market altogether. The action by the German regulatory authorities also
demonstrated that the discretion of the authority to choose when a bank will be
closed can have a major impact on the allocation of losses. The creditors of
Herstatt would have been worse off if the German authorities had waited until
the end of clearing in New York.20
Herstatt also made clear that the impact of the failure of even a small bank
can be amplified if it interrupts an important clearing and settlement process. In
this case, the dollar/deutsche mark market, at the time the largest foreign
exchange market in the world, came to a virtual halt for more than a month
until the authorities and the New York Clearing House could restore
confidence. Finally, the Herstatt case demonstrated the difficulties of applying
judicial procedures to a bank. Judicial proceedings tend to move at a glacial
pace - the Herstatt case took more than thirty-five years to settle - while
markets move virtually at the speed of light. If Herstatt had any going-concern
value, it was surely lost in the abrupt closure, which aborted foreign exchange
transactions, and in the lengthy judicial proceedings that followed.
B. BCCI
In 1991, the Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI)
demonstrated the enormous difficulties that regulatory authorities face in
dealing with complex corporate structures, particularly when many subsidiaries
have been established to evade regulatory oversight and considerable activity
takes place in lightly regulated tax havens. BCCI was organized so that the
country in which it was chartered differed from the country of its principal
place of business, which in turn differed from the country in which the
principal managers resided, and the countries in which the greatest
concentration of assets and the greatest concentration of creditors could be
21found. It strategically exploited the asymmetries in national regulatory
20. This point was echoed by other nations regarding the timing of the Lehman
Brothers bankruptcy petition by the U.S. authorities.
21. Richard Herring, BCCI & Barings: Bank Resolutions Complicated by Fraud and
Global Corporate Structure, in SYSTEMIC FINANCIAL CRISES: RESOLVING LARGE BANK INSOLVENCIES
321-345 (Doug Evanoff and George Kaufman eds., 2005).
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resources and incentives. BCCI obtained its banking charter in Luxembourg,
but chose to do no banking business in Luxembourg.
Luxembourg not only lacked the resources to monitor a complex,
secretive global bank, but it also lacked incentives to do so since BCCI was
careful not to do banking business in Luxembourg. BCCI did, however, make
use of Luxembourg's secrecy laws to prevent other regulatory authorities from
getting an overall view of the bank.22
BCCI also revealed the profound differences in resolution and bankruptcy
policy and procedures across major financial centers. These included
differences in: the objectives of the resolution process, which entity initiates the
process, the treatment of foreign creditors, carve-outs, choice of laws to apply,
choice of the insolvency jurisdiction as well as procedural details such as the
right of set-off. In the U.S., set-offs are confined to claims on and liabilities to
the failing institution that are in the same currency and appear on the books of
the same legal entity. British law allowed for much broader scope, permitting
set-offs without limits regarding currency, branch or the country in which a
branch is located. Luxembourg had a much more restrictive approach, however.
Set-offs could be permitted at judicial discretion only after a liquidation order
had been issued.
More fundamentally, BCCI highlighted the significant differences
between countries that follow a universal principle in bankruptcy in which all
the assets are gathered in the insolvency jurisdiction and then distributed to
creditors in order of priority without regard to the location or nationality of the
23claimant , and countries (most notably the U.S.) that follow a territorial
principle in which all domestic residents must be fully paid before assets can be
handed over to the central insolvency jurisdiction. Indeed, the New York State
regulatory authorities treated the New York branch of BCCI as if it were a
separate entity and tried to collect its assets worldwide to ensure the creditors
of the New York branch would be paid off before any assets would be handed
over to the primary bankruptcy jurisdiction in Luxembourg.
The U.S. also disrupted bankruptcy proceedings by prosecuting criminal
charges against BCCI under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act. While foreign authorities resented this unilateral action, the
application of criminal investigative powers substantially increased the total
amount of assets that could ultimately be distributed to creditors.
22. Indeed, it tried to escape scrutiny by any outside entity even to the extent of hiring
two different accounting firms to audit different parts of the bank so that neither firm had a view of all of
the activities of the bank.
23. Notwithstanding their professed adherence to the universal approach, a number of
countries ring-fenced the assets they could control.
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C. Barings
In 1996, Barings revealed difficulties in achieving cooperation among
functional regulators in Britain and between home and host country supervisory
authorities. This stemmed from misalignments among regulatory objectives,
resources and incentives.
The collapse of Barings also highlighted that bank failures could
jeopardize securities markets. The collapse of Barings imposed large losses on
exchanges in Singapore and Osaka that led some members of those exchanges
to threaten to give up their memberships rather than share in the losses. The
potential disintegration of several exchanges was halted only by the rapid
intervention of the government of Singapore.
Perhaps most importantly, the collapse of Barings revealed the problems
in submitting a bank engaged in active trading to bankruptcy procedures. When
Barings entered administration, an automatic stay was placed on all of its
liabilities. This had immediate, unintended consequences. Counterparties of
Barings could not hedge effectively because they were uncertain of the amount
or the timing of their ultimate distribution from the liquidation or sale of
Barings. It also made clear that the value of a bankrupt entity could deteriorate
rapidly if its trading positions could not be actively managed. Indeed, the
volume of trading decreased sharply in markets in which Barings had been an
active participant until it was sold to ING for one pound at the end of the week.
Partly as a consequence of the problems revealed in the Barings failure,
ISDA24 succeeded in having its model close-out netting laws adopted more
widely. This meant that counterparties that had adequate collateral could, in
effect, close out and net their positions with the defaulting party and jump the
bankruptcy queue. The policy was widely adopted in the belief that it would
help sustain the liquidity of derivatives markets by protecting adequately
collateralized counterparties from the uncertainties exposed in the Barings
administration.
D. Long Term Capital Managment
In 1998, Long Term Capital Management (LTCM) revealed the darker
side of close-out netting. LTCM made a strong case to regulators (and its
creditors) that, if it failed to meet margin calls and demands for additional
collateral, its assets would be seized and sold by its counterparties. Since
market conditions were already strained in the wake of the Russian default and
LTCM's counterparties held considerable illiquid collateral, the prospect of
close-out netting raised the specter of selling illiquid assets into already thin
24. For additional information about ISDA and the importance of close-out netting laws
see David Mengle, The Importance of Close-Out Netting, INTERNATIONAL SwAPs AND DERIVATIVES
ASSOCIATION (2010), http://www.isda.org/researchnotes/pdf/Netting-ISDAResearchNotes-201 0.pdf.
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markets, causing prices to fall sharply. Thus the fire-sale losses of seized
collateral might have caused failures at other institutions that held similar
positions, the flight to quality would disrupt other, unrelated markets, and
counterparties that had not demanded sufficient collateral might themselves be
in jeopardy of failure. Given the opacity of trading positions, the lines of
contagion were likely to be both direct - because of actual exposure to LTCM -
and indirect - because of suspected exposure to LTCM or the holding of
positions suspected to be like those of LTCM. The hospitality of the New York
Fed and the enlightened self-interest of the major creditors led to what
amounted to a prepackaged bankruptcy that eased market conditions.
Nonetheless, what turned out to be a close brush with financial disaster should
have been seen as a clear warning of the potential dangers in close-out netting.
ISDA was, however, able to increase the number of countries that adopted its
model laws and the range of assets over which close-out netting could be
applied. Indeed, the widespread adoption of the ISDA model laws is probably
the most successful international harmonization achievement over the last two
decades.
In the recent crisis, many of these difficulties were echoed and several
more problems were exposed. Three cross-border failures during the recent
crisis will illustrate the points: Lehman Brothers, Fortis, and the Icelandic
banks. In each case, resolution was, out of necessity, improvised. In some
cases, the improvisation succeeded in limiting spillovers - but at substantial
cost to taxpayers. In other cases, the resolution process protected domestic
interests without regard to spillover effects in the rest of the world.25
E. Lehman Brothers
Before Lehman Brothers 2008 collapse, it was the fourth largest
investment bank in the U.S. It was more than twice as large - and twice as
complex - as Bear Stearns, which had agreed to a subsidized, shot-gun merger
with JPMorgan Chase in March of 2008 after it became unable to meet calls for
additional collateral. The Lehman Brothers Group consisted of 7,000 legal
entities in fifty countries, and many of these entities were subject to national
regulation by host countries as well as supervision by the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission. 26
25. The remainder of this section draws heavily from Chapter 3 of Stijn Claessens,
Richard Herring and Dirk Schoenmaker, A Safer World Financial System: Improving the Resolution of
Systemic Institutions, in GENEVA REPORT ON THE WORLD ECONOMY 12 (2010).
26. This is an unusually clear example of the law of unintended consequences. The EU
threatened to force the large American investment banks to form holding companies in Europe if they
did not submit to consolidated supervision by a competent authority. Although it had no prior
experience, the SEC somehow convinced the EU that it was a competent supervisory authority and the
five largest investment banks became voluntary Consolidated Entities subject to Basel II capital rules.
When they measured their required capital under Basel II, the five CSEs discovered that they had
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In 2006, Lehman had made a deliberate decision to embark on an
aggressive growth strategy and to take on greater risk by substantially
increasing its leverage and making concentrated bets on commercial real estate,
leveraged lending, and private-equity-like investments. These undertakings
were far riskier than many of its traditional lines of business because instead of
simply brokering transactions, the firm would be holding substantial amounts
of risk on its balance sheet. And these risks were financed largely by short-term
repurchase agreements often totaling hundreds of billions of dollars per day. In
the words of one Lehman employee, they had shifted from the "moving
business" to the "storage business." 27 Lehman had, in essence, taken on the risk
profile of a commercial bank without the benefit of the bank safety net. When
the sub-prime crisis erupted, Lehman's management saw it as an opportunity to
double-down on their bets, and they consistently violated their declared risk
28
appetite and risk limits to position themselves for a market rebound.
In 2008, just after the demise of Bear Steams, Lehman announced its first
loss since going public in 1994, but the firm was able to raise $6 billion in new
capital. Secretary of the Treasury Paulson, in a private communication to the
CEO of Lehman, warned that this was not enough and that if Lehman were to
announce a loss in the third quarter without having a buyer or a definitive
survival plan in place, its existence was in jeopardy.29 However, the Treasury
Department did nothing to prepare for such an eventuality by seeking statutory
power to intervene.
Lehman Brothers did not succeed in finding a merger partner or in
developing a survival plan. Instead, it resorted to window dressing its monthly
and quarterly reports by arbitraging accounting requirementso, and it
overstated its liquidity by including "comfort deposits" that it held with its
clearing banks in order to continue clearing operations with them.31
Over the weekend of September 12-14, 2008, U.S. authorities met with
CEOs of leading financial institutions from around the world to try to broker a
merger for Lehman, or at least raise a fund to subsidize a merger for the
troubled firm (as had been done for Long Term Capital Management in 1998).
At one point on Sunday afternoon, federal officials believed they had struck a
deal with Barclays Capital Management, which would be subsidized by many
considerable excess regulatory capital and quickly doubled their leverage, which was surely not what the
EU intended.
27. ANTON VALUKAS, 1 REPORT OF ANTON R. VALUKAS, EXAMINER, TO THE UNITED
STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK IN RE LEHMAN BROTHERS HOLDINGS
INC, ETALDEBTORS 44 (2010).
28. Lehman exceeded its risk limits by margins of 70% with regard to commercial real
estate and 100% with regard to leveraged loans. Id. at 50.
29. Id. at 5.
30. Id. gives a full account of the so-called "repo 105" transactions that could be
reported as sales rather than borrowings.
31. By September 12, 2008, two days after it reported $41 billion in its liquidity pool, it
actually contained less than $2 billion of readily monetizable assets. Id. at 10.
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of Barclays' competitors, but the U.K. Financial Services Authority refused to
waive the shareholder approval rights required in the U.K. Thus with no buyer
32
and, the authorities claimed, no way to find a merger partner , the Chairman of
the SEC strongly suggested that Lehman's board file for bankruptcy before the
opening of markets in Asia, when it would be unable to meet its cash
obligations. On September 15, 2009, at 1:45 a.m. Lehman Brothers Holding
Inc. (LBHI) filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,
becoming the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.33
In many respects, it is astonishing that so many market participants
expressed surprise when Lehman failed. But much of the surprise had to do
with a realization that U.S. policy had changed and that the U.S. authorities
would let a sizable financial intermediary go under. Many market participants
had believed that if the authorities had managed to find $29 billion to arrange a
merger for Bear Steams, they would also be willing and able to advance at least
$60 billion to save Lehman. It is clear that the market was not surprised that
Lehman was insolvent and had been so at several times during the summer. The
administrators of the Lehman bankruptcy in the U.S. have estimated that at
least $75 billion had been wasted because of the complete lack of any
preparation for bankruptcy. 34
The action that the U.S. authorities took could be interpreted as implying
that the collapse of Lehman was not systemically important. But the intensive
negotiations they arranged over the weekend suggest otherwise. Moreover, they
claimed to have simply lacked the statutory authority to do anything else.
While the U.S. authorities refused to support LBHI, the parent company,
they did support Lehman Brothers Inc. (LBI), the U.S. broker-dealer
subsidiary, for another five days until it could enter Securities Investor
Protection Act trusteeship on September 19, when its prime brokerage
activities, asset management business and a substantial portion of its clients'
assets and obligations were sold to Barclays Capital Inc. and others. This
removed one of the chief systemic concerns in the U.S. The other principal
concern, Lehman's leading role in the opaque OTC derivatives market, turned
out to be transient. Most derivatives were promptly closed-out and netted under
ISDA Swap Agreements. Although counterparties were not necessarily happy
with the prices they received, there were no knock-on effects attributable to the
unwinding of the derivatives book.
32. The authorities claimed that they lacked legal authority to make a direct investment
in Lehman and that Lehman's assets were insufficient to support a loan large enough to prevent
collapse.
33. For an alternative scenario, based on the assumption that FDIC would have had the
powers that it ultimately received under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act, see Christine E. Blair, Rose M.
Kushmeider, Jack Reidhill, and F. Angus Tarpley II, The Orderly Liquidation of Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc. under the Dodd-Frank Act, 5 FDIC Quarterly no. 2, 2011 at 31.,
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/quarterly/2011 vol5 2/lehman.pdf.
34. Ann Cairns, Breaking the Insolvency Mould, 6 INT. C. R. 115 (2009),
http://www.chasecambria.com/site/journalarticle.php?id=384
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The only domestic impact that could be labeled systemic was due to a
"moral hazard" play by the managers of the $62 billion Reserve Primary Fund,
a wholesale money market fund that "broke the buck" because of its outsized
holdings of Lehman's commercial paper, which yielded a return substantially
higher than its rating would warrant. News that the oldest money market
mutual fund had seen the net asset value of its shares fall below a dollar started
a run on other money market mutual funds, which led to dumping corporate
commercial paper on the market to meet the demand for withdrawals.
The collapse of prices in the secondary market caused the primary market
for commercial paper to shut down. Commercial paper is the primary mode of
finance for much of corporate America and so the Treasury hastily provided
insurance for money market mutual funds. (And to maintain parity, the
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act temporarily increased the deposit
insurance ceiling from $100,000 to $250,000). The Fed also intervened to
support the commercial paper market directly.
Still many observers interpreted this as a successful application of
bankruptcy rules to a large, complex financial institution.35 Apart from the
unanticipated spillover to the wholesale money market and knock-on effect on
the commercial paper market, the U.S. had shown that the economy could
function perfectly well without Lehman Brothers.
This relatively orderly outcome in the U.S. was in stark contrast to the
chaos created abroad. The immediacy of the impact was in large part due to the
highly integrated structure of the Lehman Group. Like many other global
financial firms, Lehman managed substantially all of its cash resources
centrally at the holding company. Since LBHI declared bankruptcy before cash
could be swept out again to the subsidiaries, these subsidiaries found
themselves suddenly illiquid and unable to continue operation. Bankruptcy
proceedings were initiated in numerous jurisdictions around the world.
Because London was Lehman's largest center of activity outside the U.S.,
many of the problems showed up most vividly there.
The London subsidiaries, including Lehman Brothers International
Europe, its largest broker/dealer in Europe, filed for bankruptcy and turned to
PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PwC) for administration. Because there is no
provision under British law for debtor in possession financing, the
administrators had to struggle to find money to maintain even the most basic
services such as the employee cafeteria.
35. See Kenneth Ayotte and David Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy or Bailouts? 35 J. CORP. L.
469 (2010).
36. Some Lehman Brothers entities did not file for bankruptcy, however. For example,
the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy estate operates a bank, today known as Aurora Bank FSB, which
employs 1,700 people servicing over $100 billion in mortgages. See Kimberly Summe, Lessons Learned
from the Lehman Bankruptcy, Chapter 5, in ENDING GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS As WE KNow THEM 65
(Kenneth E. Scott, George P. Shultz, and John B. Taylor eds., 2010).
870
Vol. 31, 2014
Resolving Cross-Border Financial Institutions
PwC was confronted with 43,000 trades that were still "live" and would
need to be negotiated separately with each of the counterparties. The
integration of the group was such that a trade performed by one affiliate could
be booked in another, without the client necessarily being aware that the
location of the asset had shifted. Record-keeping fell into disarray when LBHI
filed for bankruptcy. At the time of filing, Lehman maintained a patchwork of
over 2,600 software systems applications, many of which were outdated or
arcane. These systems were highly interdependent, but difficult to decipher and
not well documented. Moreover, most systems covering trading, valuation,
financial accounting and other activities had been transferred to Barclays in the
sale, and Barclays had integrated its own proprietary and confidential data into
some of the systems.37 Thus many non-U.S. affiliates experienced enormous
difficulties even in determining what their balance sheets were and who owed
what to whom.
Although arrangements were ultimately negotiated with Barclays for
access to some essential information, it was almost impossible to salvage much
going-concern value out of the rest of the group (with the exception of the sale
of the foreign equity business to Nomura by PwC). In London, where much of
the prime brokerage business had shifted, it was permissible to mingle client
funds with the firm's own funds, so several hedge funds suddenly became
illiquid.
The fragmented data system impeded the salvaging of going-concern
value from the remainder of the Lehman Group because different parts of a line
of business were lodged in different subsidiaries in various parts of the world.
So the administrators had no way of reintegrating their lines of business even if
those business lines had been viable.
Significant value was destroyed by the lack of cooperation in the
unwinding of the Lehman Group, a process that may continue for a decade. The
systemic impact of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers is difficult to sort out
because it occurred amid a number of different shocks to the system. For
example, Lehman collapsed just after Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac entered
conservatorship, protecting all creditors and counterparties, but causing losses
to both common and preferred shareholders. And just two days later the same
authorities that sent Lehman to the bankruptcy courts bailed out AIG. The Dow
Jones Industrial Average fell 150 points the day Lehman declared bankruptcy,
but a considerable part of this may have been due to the apparent change in the
rules of regulatory intervention. The explanations offered by Federal officials
regarding why they protected creditors and counterparties of Bear Steams but
not those of Lehman Brothers were neither consistent nor convincing. The run
on money market funds and, subsequently, the collapse of the commercial
37. In addition, the technology supporting the prime brokerage business was
inadvertently sold to Nomura in the U.K., rather than Barclays, which acquired that U.S. business.
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paper market were a direct result of the collapse of the value of Lehman
commercial paper.
In many ways, the Lehman bankruptcy was unnecessarily disruptive. The
firm was badly supervised and regulated, and benefited from widespread
expectations (that turned out to be false) that its creditors and counterparties
would be protected if worse came to worst. The U.S. acted unilaterally,
providing liquidity for an orderly resolution for the U.S. broker/dealer arm of
Lehman through a merger with Barclays Capital, but providing no cooperation
to other countries unwinding the Lehman subsidiaries in forty-nine other
countries, including, most notably, the major operations in the U.K.
F. Fortis
38
Fortis was likely to fail eventually from the weight of its own problems,
but its end was undoubtedly hastened by the collapse of the wholesale
interbank market after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Fortis was a
financial conglomerate incorporated in Belgium, listed on both Euronext
Amsterdam and Euronext Brussels, with substantial banking and insurance
activities in Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg (the Benelux
countries). In May 2007, Fortis joined with the Royal Bank of Scotland and
Santander in a complex transaction to acquire ABN-AMRO for £71 billion.
After outbidding Barclays Bank in this takeover battle, the trio planned to
divide ABN-AMRO's activities among them. Fortis was to acquire the
domestic Dutch business of ABN-AMRO as well as its private banking and
asset management operations for a price of £24 billion, at a time when the
market capitalization of Fortis was around £40 billion.
The deal, together with a £13 billion equity issue, was approved by Fortis'
shareholders in August 2007. But the market perception of the financial
strength of Fortis was weakened when it disclosed a £40 billion CDO/RMBS
portfolio based on U.S. mortgages. Thus overleveraged and with a weak
balance sheet, difficulties began to surface at Fortis by June 2008. At that time,
Fortis announced a new equity issue and cancelled its dividend payment. Both
steps violated earlier promises, and this led to a sharp drop in the Fortis share
price. Liquidity became a serious concern and intensified uncertainty in the
market about whether Fortis would be able to execute its planned acquisition of
part of ABN-AMRO.
Fortis was systemically important in three countries - Belgium, the
Netherlands, and Luxembourg - because of its large presence in each country
as well as its role as a clearing member at several exchanges. The Benelux
38. Mathias Dewatripont and Jean-Charles Rochet, The Treatment ofDistressed Banks,
in MACROECONOMIC STABILITY AND FINANCIAL REGULATION: KEY ISSUES FOR THE G20 149-164
(Mathias Dewatripont, Xavier Freixas and Richard Portes eds., 2009); BASEL COMM. ON BANKING
SUPERVISION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CROSS-BORDER RESOLUTION GROUP (2010).
See also FRANCIS VAN DE WOESTYNE AND ARIANE VAN CALOEN, FORTIS, DEX7A ... LE SISME (2009).
872
Vol. 31, 2014
Resolving Cross-Border Financial Institutions
countries have had a long history of cooperation in monetary affairs and so the
preconditions for a cooperative resolution process were as strong as in any
other three countries one could name.
The coordinating supervisor was the Belgian Banking, Finance and
Insurance Commission (CBFA), which remained lead supervisor of Fortis,
despite the importance of the Dutch activities after the acquisition of ABN-
AMRO. Fortis' weakness proved fatal after the Lehman failure and subsequent
disorder in interbank markets. By September 24, 2008, interbank lending to
Fortis had collapsed and significant deposit withdrawals were starting to take
place. The crisis was managed by each of the three nations, acting separately
most of the time. When Fortis was initially recapitalized, the Belgian, Dutch
and Luxembourg governments provided capital injections of £4.7, £4.0 and
E2.5 billion to Belgium's Fortis Bank, Fortis Bank Netherlands, and Fortis
Bank Luxembourg respectively - but not to the Fortis Group as a whole. The
capital injections more or less reflected asymmetries in the exposure to loss
among the three countries. However, this agreement failed to calm the markets,
obliging the National Bank of Belgium, as the home country's central bank, to
keep providing massive Emergency Liquidity Assistance to Fortis in the next
days.
In the second round of negotiations, the Dutch government sought to
regain control of the Dutch business of Fortis as well as its ABN-AMRO
business for a combined total of E16.8 billion. In addition, the Dutch
government took over the £50 billion funding of Fortis Bank Netherlands from
Fortis Bank Belgium. While the Dutch government essentially nationalized the
Dutch parts of Fortis, the solvent Belgian/Luxembourger banking parts were
sold (75% stake) to BNP Paribas. In December 2008, the Brussels Court
suspended the sale to BNP Paribas and decided the sales to the Dutch
government and the Belgian government, and the subsequent sale to BNP
Paribas, had to be submitted for shareholder approval in order for these sales to
be valid under Belgian law. Although this final intervention stabilized the
Dutch and Belgian banking systems, the evident difficulties the Benelux
countries had in achieving a cooperative solution increased uncertainty about
large cross-border banks in Europe and raised the cost of the rescue operation.
Shareholder approval was obtained for the BNP-Paribas deal, after
renegotiating the sale. The decision of the Brussels Court was later overturned
by the Belgium Court of Appeals, which decided that no shareholder approval
was needed. This episode demonstrated the problem that supervisors face if
they do not have effective resolution powers overriding shareholders' rights
before insolvency. If the authorities cannot intervene before a bank is clearly
insolvent, they will be unable to prevent losses. Once losses have been
incurred, cooperation will be even more difficult.
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G. Icelandic Banking System
The Icelandic banking system 39 experienced a deep financial crisis when
its three major banks all collapsed in the same week in October 2008. After the
Icelandic banking system was deregulated and privatized in the 1990s and early
2000s, banking had quickly become one of the largest sectors of the economy
and ultimately grew to an asset size about ten times that of the Icelandic
economy. Banking supervision was unable to monitor and curb risks taken by
the booming banking sector.
Two factors made the Icelandic banking system more fragile than its
counterparts abroad. First, unlike many other nations with an outsized banking
system, such as Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, the
institutional experience of running a modem banking system in Iceland
spanned less than a decade, not centuries. Second, the banks had invested
significant portions of their funds in their own shares and in each other's
shares. These cross-shareholdings did not provide a buffer against loss, but
instead became a central channel of contagion.
Iceland provides a clear example of the problems in assuming that all
nations are equal with regard to bank regulation and supervision. As a member
of the European Economic Area (EEA), Iceland had essentially the same
banking regulations as other EEA/EU countries, but its ability and incentives to
enforce the rules fell short of the standards in other countries.
During the boom years, Icelandic banks relied on the wholesale markets to
fund themselves, but when wholesale markets began to dry up they tried to
attract internet savings accounts by offering high rates, especially in the U.K.
Landsbanki, one of the three Icelandic banks, offered its Icesave accounts
through local branches in the U.K. Because these offices were branches rather
than subsidiaries, they were primarily regulated, supervised and insured in
Iceland following the European Second Banking Directive. Icesave deposits in
the U.K. grew to over £4 billion. Under the EU's Second Banking Directive,
the host country supervisors lacked the power to supervise the solvency of
these branches.
The three Icelandic banks were clearly systemic in their home country, but
not so in the host countries. As concerns about the Icelandic banks increased in
September 2008, the Icelandic government purchased a seventy-five percent
stake for E600 million in Glitnir Bank, the smallest of the country's three large
banks. But the partial nationalization of Glitnir shook confidence in the
Icelandic banking system and the Icelandic state. The government and the
banks had repeatedly claimed that all of the three main banks were liquid and
solvent. The failure of Glitnir undermined confidence in the other two banks
39. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision supra note 38; Jon Danielsson and Gylfi
Zoega, COLLAPSE OF A COUNTRY (2nd edition, 2009); Special Investigation, Report of the Althingi
Special Investigation Commission, Althingi, Iceland (2010).
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and in the government's ability to assess the condition of its banks. The
immediate effect was to cause credit lines to be withdrawn from the two
remaining banks. There was also a run on Landsbanki's Icesave branch in the
U.K. Under the Second Banking Directive, the U.K. lacked the authority to
intervene even though the home country, Iceland, had failed to inform or
cooperate with the U.K. authorities. Constrained by the Second Banking
Directive from directly intervening in the branch, the U.K. authorities made
innovative use of a clause in their antiterrorist laws that enabled them to freeze
the assets of Landsbanki branches. This highly unusual application of the
antiterrorist laws highlighted one of the key problems inherent in assuming that
all supervisory authorities are equal, when in fact, they are not.
In response to the crisis, the Icelandic government had prepared
emergency legislation granting it widespread powers to maintain the domestic
operations of the banks. This legislation, which was passed by the Icelandic
Parliament on October 6, 2008, created "new banks" from the ruins of the old
ones to hold domestic deposits and loans. But the foreign operations, including
the foreign branches, were left behind and put into administration. This violated
the EU Deposit Insurance Directive, which requires equal treatment of
domestic and foreign depositors. But during the crisis, Iceland chose to protect
all domestic depositors and not those abroad.40 This example provides a caution
against the host country relying on understandings, agreements or, in this case,
a treaty to control the parent government's behavior during a crisis and may
reinforce the tendency of many countries to ring-fence first and negotiate later.
Despite the numerous Memoranda of Understanding pledging to share
information before the collapse of an institution, the primary supervisor failed
to do so in all the preceding cases. This undoubtedly reflects the reluctance to
share bad news noted above. But without sufficient cooperation among the
relevant regulatory authorities to share bad news, the scope for a harmonized
approach to cross-border resolution is severely limited.
V. Concluding Comment: The Single Point of Entry
This article has reviewed the many reasons that it is unlikely that countries
will ever voluntarily harmonize their resolution procedures. These include the
fundamental problem of information sharing, the presence of multiple
regulatory authorities with differing resolution procedures and objectives, the
organizational and corporate complexity of G-SIBs and asymmetries across
countries with regard to regulatory and supervisory resources and incentives to
take action in any particular case. All of these challenges are heightened by the
40. This is an example of an asymmetry that complicates cross-border cooperation.
Iceland lacked both the incentive and the resources to cooperate. The U.K. had reason to intervene, but
lacked the authority. More generally this problem arises when most of a country's banks are foreign-
owned, such as in much of Eastern Europe. In these cases the foreign banks are systemic in the host
country, but the host country subsidiary is unlikely to be of systemic importance in the home country.
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reality that if sovereign countries fear that their residents will not be treated
equitably in a cross-border resolution, they can ring-fence the assets of a
resident branch or subsidiary in an attempt to protect local interests.
While efforts by the FSB to promote the adoption of the Key Attributes
are showing progress in some major economies, they do not address the most
difficult problem of how to allocate losses if necessary. While it is certainly
preferable to strengthen supervision and resolution procedures so that G-SIBs
are resolved before they become insolvent and generate losses that must be
allocated, we have little evidence that the authorities have the ability or will to
do so. Instead, despite the growing network of international agreements, many
countries are likely to ring-fence the part of a G-SIB in their jurisdictions
unless they can be assured that the interests of their residents will be protected
in a resolution conducted by the G-SIB's home country.
The inability to rule out ring-fencing has profound consequences. G-SIBs
would be unwise to manage their capital or liquidity on an integrated basis
under the assumption that funds can be shifted from a surplus entity to a deficit
entity in times of stress. Unfortunately, it is precisely in times of stress that the
ability to move resources across borders is most important. But if capital and
liquidity must be managed on a legal entity basis, G-SIBs will require
substantially more capital and liquidity to support their operations. Thus G-
SIBs have a major stake in achieving cooperative resolutions.
If ring-fencing cannot be ruled out, the very foundations of international
regulation and supervision must be reconsidered. The basic principle that
underlies the Basel Concordat on Supervision and the Basel Accords on capital
adequacy is that banks should be evaluated on a consolidated basis. But if funds
cannot be shifted across borders in times of stress, monitoring banks on a
consolidated basis may be entirely misleading.
Since the preceding sections have argued that differences in resolution
policy are unlikely to be harmonized effectively, it is essential to finesse the
existing legal, geographical and regulatory complexity of G-SIBs to find a way
to preserve the going-concern value of a failing G-SIB without public subsidy
and without damaging spillovers that would jeopardize international financial
stability.
The Bank of England and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation have
jointly proposed a resolution strategy, called the Single Point of Entry (SPE),
which attempts to finesse many of these challenges.41 It is a "top-down"
strategy that involves a single resolution authority applying its powers to the
41. For the latest statement of the strategy see, Resolution of Systemically Important
Financial Institutions: The Single Point of Entry Strategy, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP. (2013),
http://fdic.gov/news/board/2013-12-10_notice-dis-b-fr.pdf. For the original joint proposal see Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. and the Bank of Eng., Resolving Globallv Active. Systemically Important, Financial
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parent holding company of a banking group. The strategy would apply a single
receivership at the top-tier holding company.
The Orderly Liquidation Authority set out in the Dodd-Frank Act assigns
to the FDIC the responsibility for resolving systemically important financial
institutions when bankruptcy42 would have serious adverse effects on financial
stability in the United States. The SPE is a strategy to fulfill this responsibility
while at the same time protecting taxpayers from loss. The SPE ensures the
continuity of all critical services performed by the operating subsidiaries, thus
reducing the risk of contagion and cross-border complications. In effect,
regulatory authorities abroad will be assured that operating subsidiaries in their
jurisdictions will be unaffected by the resolution taking place at the top-level
holding company in the hope that they will not intervene while financial and
operational restructuring take place.
The costs of resolution are intended to fall on shareholders of the top-level
holding company and, to the extent necessary, its unsecured creditors. The
failed holding company would be left behind and placed in receivership. But all
of its assets, including shares in its subsidiaries, would be transferred to a
newly formed Bridge Financial Holding Company (FHC), under the temporary
control of the FDIC. This would keep the subsidiaries out of insolvency
proceedings. The shareholders of the failed holding company would absorb
first losses up to the point at which the value of the holding company shares
would be eliminated. Additional losses would fall on holding company
creditors according to the priority order of their claims. The remaining portion
of their claims would be converted to equity in the new bridge FHC. These
creditors would become the new owners of the bridge FHC and the
management deemed responsible for the failure of the BHC would be replaced.
The claims of the failed holding company on its subsidiaries would be
converted to equity and transferred to the bridge FHC. This financial
restructuring would be accompanied by an operational restructuring focused
especially on parts of the business that were the source of weakness. These
measures may include shrinking the business, breaking it into smaller entities
and/or liquidating and closing some operations.
The SPE is an ingenious proposal but it has been met with some
skepticism. First, some doubt whether the regulatory authorities will require
BHCs to issue enough unsecured debt and equity to ensure that enough
resources are available to absorb losses and recapitalize the bridge FHC. The
record of the authorities with regard to establishing and enforcing sufficiently
high capital adequacy requirements does not inspire much confidence.
42. The Dodd-Frank Act emphasizes that bankruptcy is the preferred option for all bank
holding companies. The requirement to prepare Living Wills is intended to press institutions to simplify
their operations and organizational structures so that they will be easier to resolve in bankruptcy. If an
institution fails to develop a credible resolution plan under bankruptcy over a specified period, the FDIC
and the Fed are authorized to compel simplification, including divestitures.
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Second, some critics fear that the process would simply transfer too-big-
to-fail status from the holding company to the major operating subsidiaries with
negligible impact on systemic risk. Counterparty discipline on the operating
subsidiaries would diminish to the extent counterparties and creditors feel
protected by the resolution process. The source of the "bailout" in this case,
however, would be the shareholders and creditors of the failed BHC, not the
taxpayer. Moreover, the FDIC has asserted that serious operational
restructuring must take place when an institution enters restructuring under
Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act. Since an institution would undergo a Title II
resolution because it was judged to be too complex or too interrelated to be
taken through bankruptcy procedures, the FDIC insists that the institutions that
emerge from the process must be easy to resolve under bankruptcy. Thus the
institution (or institutions) that emerge from the process will differ markedly
from the institution that entered.
One challenge the bridge FHC must face immediately is how to fund its
operations. The authorities hope that the newly formed bridge FHC will have
sufficient credibility in wholesale markets to be able to fund itself, but during
the Great Recession it was evident that borrowers had difficulty in obtaining
funding even on a collateralized basis. Thus debtor in possession financing may
be impossible to arrange in the short run. The Dodd-Frank Act has provided for
this contingency by enabling the FDIC to draw on an Orderly Liquidation
Facility provided by the Treasury. Some argue that this could result in a
taxpayer bailout in disguise. But the authors of the Dodd-Frank Act tried to
ensure this would not be the outcome. First, any loans made will have first
priority over all unsecured creditors. Second, the amount that can be lent is
limited to ninety percent of the fair value of the bridge FHC's assets. Third, the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Chairman of the FDIC must agree to a
specific plan and schedule for full repayment. Fourth, if the assets of the bridge
FHC nonetheless prove inadequate to fully repay the loan, the FDIC is
authorized to "claw back" amounts from creditors to the extent they received
payments greater than the amounts they would have received if the group had
been liquidated. Finally, if the claw-back payments are not sufficient to repay
the loan, the FDIC is required to impose a risk-based assessment on BHCs with
$50 billion or more in assets. The Dodd-Frank Act attempts to make certain
that taxpayers will never be tapped to cover losses at the failed BHC.
Foreign critics note that the Dodd-Frank Act authorizes an FDIC
resolution only if American financial stability is threatened. This leaves
unanswered the question of what would happen if the American financial
system were not in jeopardy, but the failure would cause massive disruptions
abroad. The experience of foreign regulators in the wake of the Lehman
bankruptcy has caused them to be concerned about this scenario. More
fundamentally, they complain that a number of American policies are
inconsistent with fair and equal treatment of all creditors in the event of an
insolvency. They cite America's depositor preference law (which gives the
878
Vol. 31, 2014
Resolving Cross-Border Financial Institutions
claims of all American depositors priority over the claims of any foreign
depositor), the ability to apply the Single Entity Approach to U. S. branches of
foreign institutions (as in the case of BCCI), and the imposition of intermediate
holding companies on large foreign banks operating in the United States (which
will require them to adhere to U.S. prudential regulations that are more
stringent than home country regulations).
Others worry about whether the policy will work if the cause of the
insolvency is massive losses at a foreign subsidiary that exhaust the loss
absorption capacity of the holding company. Official descriptions of the SPE
stop just short of guaranteeing that all operating facilities will continue. The
FDIC cannot promise to prop up all operating subsidiaries regardless of their
viability because this would be a direct violation of the no bailout policy. But
this introduces a troubling ambiguity. If regulators and creditors of a foreign
subsidiary are not confident that the entity will continue its operations,
regulators may have an incentive to ring-fence and creditors will run, thus
undermining the effectiveness of the SPE.
Another concern arises because the foreign subsidiary may have
negotiated a broad range of swaps and derivatives contracts in which the
counterparty has the right to close-out and net all of its position with the
subsidiary in the event of a change in control or if a member of the group goes
bankrupt. The Dodd-Frank Act prohibits such close-outs in America so long as
the failed entity's derivative contracts are transferred to a solvent third party,
such as the bridge financial holding company, within 24 hours of the
appointment of a receiver under Title II. 43 The FDIC has strengthened this
provision by precluding a cross-default termination when a counterparty's
affiliate is a failed financial institution that has been placed in receivership
under Title II of the Dodd-Frank Act. While these measures protect subsidiaries
in the U.S. from disorderly close-outs in response to the bankruptcy of the
holding company, the FDIC lacks the authority to extend the same protection to
subsidiaries located abroad. For that reason the American, British, German and
Swiss regulatory authorities wrote a public letter to the International Swap
Dealers Association asking that such contracts be modified to include a
provision for a short-term suspension of early termination rights based on the
commencement of an insolvency or resolution procedure."
Finally, even if the SPOE works as planned, it is unlikely to be able to
deal with more than one or two insolvencies at the same time. If the shock to
the financial system undermines the solvency of a larger number of institutions,
a more massive intervention would be required.
43. Dodd-Frank Act Section 210(c)(10)(B)
44. Letter from The Fed. Deposit Ins. Co. and the Bank of Eng., to Stephen O'Connor,
Chairman, Int'l Swaps and Derivatives Assoc., 2013,
http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2013/prl3099a.pdf.
879
Yale Journal on Regulation
Despite these concerns, the SPE remains the only plausible proposal to
finesse the existing legal, organizational, geographical and regulatory
complexities that inhibit progress toward a harmonized international resolution
regime. If it works, the SPOE may preserve most of the going-concern value of
a failing G-SEB without public subsidy and with minimal spillovers to other
institutions that would jeopardize the stability of the financial system.
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Figure 1
Government Intervention to Support the Banking System Equivalent to 25% of
World GDP
($ Trillions) UK US Euro
Central Bank
- "Money creation" 0.32 3.76 0.98
- Collateral swaps 0.30 0.20 0.00
Government
- Guarantees 0.64 2.08 >1.68
- Insurance 0.33 3.74 0.00
- Capital 0.12 0.70 0.31
Total (% GDP) 74% 73% 18%
Source: Bank of England FinaridStabiity Rqw , June 2009. Figures for UK updated to November 4th 2009.
Notes: (2) Exchange rates used: FSR Euro i US dollar exdange rate of 0.710. Sterling US dolar exchange rate of 0 613.
(2) Money creation includes both monetary and financial stabiity opemtions.
From Haldane (2009)
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